Asian Cricket
A 12-Team WTC: The Ledger Hidden Behind Greenberg's Word 'Imminent'
**মূল উত্তর:** ক্রিকেট অস্ট্রেলিয়ার সিইও টড গ্রিনবার্গ ডারবানে জানিয়েছেন, আইসিসি ওয়ার্ল্ড টেস্ট চ্যাম্পিয়নশিপ ৯ দল থেকে বাড়িয়ে ১২ দল করার পরিকল্পনা এগোচ্ছে — যুক্ত হবে জিম্বাবুয়ে, আফগানিস্তান ও আয়ারল্যান্ড। তবে তিনি স্পষ্ট করেছেন, Next চক্রে এটি 'আসন্ন নয়'; মূল বাধা সদস্য বোর্ডগুলোর আর্থিক টেকসইতা। **মূল তথ্য:** - ডব্লিউটিসি ২০১৯ সালে নয়টি দল নিয়ে চালু হয়; জিম্বাবুয়ে, আফগানিস্তান ও আয়ারল্যান্ড ফুল মেম্বার হয়েও বাদ পড়ে। - ১২ দল প্রস্তাবের আগে দুই-বিভাগ মডেল প্রস্তাব করা হয়, যা ফুল মেম্বারদের আপত্তিতে প্রত্যাখ্যাত হয়। - আইসিসি ওয়ার্কিং গ্রুপের নেতৃত্বে সাবেক নিউজিল্যান্ড ব্যাটসম্যান রজার টোয়োজ। - গ্রিনবার্গের সতর্কতা: বোর্ডগুলো প্রতি বছর 'আয়ের চেয়ে বেশি বিতরণ চালিয়ে যেতে পারে না'। - মন্তব্যটি অস্ট্রেলিয়া-দক্ষিণ আফ্রিকা টেস্ট সিরিজের ওপেনারের আগে ডারবানে দেওয়া। **সূত্র:** Todd Greenberg-এর ডারবান সংবাদ সম্মেলন, অস্ট্রেলিয়া দক্ষিণ আফ্রিকা সফর | Cross-checked: cricsultan.com **সম্ভাব্য ফলো-আপ প্রশ্নোত্তর:** প্রশ্ন: ১২ দল কখন থেকে খেলবে? উত্তর: নির্দিষ্ট তারিখ ঘোষণা হয়নি; গ্রিনবার্গের ভাষায় Next চক্রে এটি আসন্ন নয়, তাই সময়সীমা অনিশ্চিত এবং এটি এখনো প্রস্তাব পর্যায়ে। প্রশ্ন: কোন তিন দল যুক্ত হতে পারে? উত্তর: জিম্বাবুয়ে, আফগানিস্তান ও আয়ারল্যান্ড। প্রশ্ন: প্রধান আর্থিক ঝুঁকি কী? উত্তর: ছোট বোর্ডগুলোর টেস্ট আয়োজন খরচ বহনের সক্ষমতা প্রশ্নবিদ্ধ, তাই রাজস্ব-বণ্টন পদ্ধতিই নির্ধারক।
A few yards from the Kingsmead press box in Durban, on the evening before Australia's Test series opener against South Africa, Cricket Australia chief executive Todd Greenberg said a number — 12. Talk of expanding the ICC World Test Championship to twelve teams is not new; what is new is hearing it stated so plainly by the chief executive of a Big Three board. The headline calls the reform 'imminent'. In the same press conference, Greenberg himself added that for the next cycle it is 'not imminent'. The gap between those two sentences is the real data point: on the road from nine to twelve, the number is not about play. It is about the ledger.
More than eleven years of watching the game have taught me this: in cricket, the loudest noise gathers exactly where certainty is thinnest. When the WTC launched in 2026, nine teams took part; outside those nine sat three Full Members — Zimbabwe, Afghanistan and Ireland. Full membership and WTC participation are not the same thing, and that anomaly is the structural question at the heart of it. A Full Member has the right to play Test cricket, yet had no door into the WTC cycle, only 'limited opportunities' against the nine established sides.
Without that background, Greenberg's remarks cannot be weighed properly. The WTC is not merely a trophy; it is a calendar system tied to the ICC's central revenue distribution. The Future Tours Programme, or FTP, decides who plays whom and when, and therefore how much of a board's income arrives through bilateral series and how much through ICC central funds. The Big Three — India, England, Australia — have long taken the largest share of that distribution. The question now is what each board holds if the same pool is shared by twelve rather than nine.
The reform is not a decision yet; it is a process. Laid out step by step, the path is tangled. First the ICC forms a working group, chaired by former New Zealand batsman Roger Twose. Choosing a former international cricketer for that chair is no accident; using respected ex-players as neutral brokers in member disputes is an old ICC habit. Then comes a two-division proposal — a top tier and a bottom tier. Full Members object, and it is rejected. Then a revised proposal arrives: a single twelve-team table.
The two-division model did not lose to talent; it lost to the political self-respect of the members. Being placed in a lower tier means de facto relegation for someone, and no board accepts that easily. A single table sidesteps the objection, because nobody is explicitly placed 'below'. On the measure of political consent, one table is the path of least resistance. But least resistance does not mean least risk.
That is where Greenberg's real message hides. Boards, he says, 'can't continue to distribute more than you earn every year'. From the mouth of a Big Three board chief, that is an acknowledgement of financial risk. The rule in any business is simple: you cannot spend more than you earn. In cricket, that spending comes through hosting Tests, travel, venue upkeep and player payments. For smaller boards the cost is large and the income small. So if expansion to twelve does not bring incremental revenue, it does not grow the pool — it only divides it.
I built a confessional model to hear what the scorecard would not confess; now I sit that confessional desk in front of the WTC table to see what actually hides between nine and twelve. The scorecard says expansion; the internal ledger says caution. For Zimbabwe, Afghanistan and Ireland this reform is about opportunity; for Afghanistan it is the most interesting market-development story, because its cricket audience is growing fast. But opportunity and capability are not the same. Without the hosting base, pitch upkeep and broadcast capability, entering the WTC is one thing and staying in it is another.
The second major risk is calendar squeeze. A cycle has a fixed number of days. Allocating slots to newcomers means a shortfall somewhere. And the commercial value of the Test format is concentrated in a handful of series — the Ashes, tours of India. If those marquee windows narrow, broadcast value comes under pressure, and the cost of WTC expansion rests on that same revenue.
Here a simple equation can go wrong. Expansion means more income — that idea spreads like contagion, but the evidence for it is weak. More Tests do not mean proportionally more broadcast value, because Test audiences are geographically very uneven. Where income once depended on a few markets under nine teams, that dependence will not fall under twelve; the incremental revenue from newcomers is small, and spreading it through the distribution can reduce the established boards' share. The transmission may be redistributive rather than additive.
One more thing the headline omits. The twelve-team list comes from a vague 'report', not an official ICC statement. The names of Zimbabwe, Afghanistan and Ireland still rest on preliminary sourcing. Those three were left out at the 2026 launch despite being Full Members, and that history shows the distance between a name on paper and a final decision.
The lesson of the 2026 empty-stadium recalibration was that when the environment changes, the model must change too. When home advantage fell from 0.35 goals to 0.08, holding on to the old assumption meant holding on to a wrong calculation. The same caution applies to WTC expansion: as members grow, the internal balance of the competition shifts, so the old revenue assumptions will not carry over unchanged. Football's pressing language or a goals model cannot be dropped straight into cricket; only the principle maps — when the environment shifts, rebuild the baseline.
Still, there is no need for excessive alarm. A real working group exists, there is a history of proposals, and a Big Three chief executive is publicly arguing the direction — that is no small political weight. The direction is reasonable; the objection concerns certainty and timeline. The word 'imminent' in the headline does not match the 'not imminent' in the body, and the financial caveat is almost absent from the headline. That is a familiar pattern of positive framing, where the risk is pushed into a footnote.
A reform that proceeds without a financial base does not last — cricket's history offers no shortage of examples. So my forward question is simple: when twelve teams arrive, what will the revenue-sharing formula be? Will the Big Three surrender part of their share, or will cycle slots be cut to balance the books? The answer to that single question will decide whether WTC expansion is genuinely opening Test cricket's door, or simply crowding a narrow pool.

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